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NOTES
RIGHTS OF THE FEDERAL PAROLEE THREATENED
WITH PAROLE REVOCATION
At various times commentators have urged that parolees accused of vio-
lating conditions of their paroles be accorded the traditional procedural
rights to which persons accused of crime are entitled prior to conviction,
especially those rights which are collectively conceived as comprising pro-
cedural due process of law. Despite early judicial negation of pleas for
procedural guarantees, statutes and cases which reflect, and in some measure
adopt, the urgings of the commentators can be found in increasing number.
No doubt increased awareness that the administration of criminal justice
does not end with conviction has contributed to this trend. Perhaps recogni-
tion of the potential rehabilitative function of parole has also been a factor.
Supervision and revocation of conditional freedom-parole-by an ad-
ministrative agency has been an American practice since 1877.1 While
some state courts have denied the right to an administrative hearing before
final parole revocation,' this right has been guaranteed in the federal prison
system since 1910. In that year Congress established separate parole boards
for each federal penitentiary and provided that before revocation, accused
parole violators would have an "opportunity to appear" before the respective
boards.' This phrase remains intact in the statutory law, although subse-
1. The first American parole statute was passed by the New York legislature in 1877.
N. Y. Laws 1877, ch. 173, § 5. See Sharp, Modern Sentencing in Federal Courts: the
Effect on Probation and Parole, 12 AM. U.L. Rv. 167 (1963). Antedating the American
administrative practice was the analogous supervision of conditional pardons by the Eng-
lish courts at common law. State ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d 150
(1950).
2. E.g., Ex parte Dearo, 96 Cal. App. 2d 141, 214 P.2d 585 (1950); In the Matter of
Carpenter, 348 Mich. 408, 83 N.W.2d 326, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850 (1957); State ex
rel. Bush v. Whittier, 226 Minn. 356, 32 N.W.2d 856 (1948); Ex parte Owen, 89 Neb.
596, 131 N.W. 914 (1911); In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957); Ex
parte Mose, 74 Okla. Crim. 134, 124 P.2d 264 (1942) ; Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409,
229 P.2d 633 (1951); Ex parte Lewis, 170 Tex. Crim. 254, 339 S.W.2d 900 (1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1961); McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945).
See 4 ATT'y GEN. Suavzy OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 240-47 (1938).
3. Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 820.
4. Section 6 of the act provided:
that at the next meeting of the board of parole held at such prison after the issuing
[by the board] of the warrant for the retaking of any paroled prisoner, said board of
parole shall be notified thereof and if said prisoner shall have been returned to said
prison, he shall be given an opportunity to appear before said board of parole, and
the said board may then or at any time in its discretion revoke the order and
terminate said parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof.
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quent amendments, including one that consolidated the several boards into
a single Federal Parole Board,5 have changed the composition of the body
conducting revocation hearings.
The purpose of this note is to inquire into the extent to which the accused
federal parole violator is accorded, at the three principal phases of parole
revocation-retaking, revocation hearing, and judicial review-ights that
parallel the guarantees of procedural due process of law. It also indicates
that the federal courts usually consider these rights to be derived solely from
the federal parole statute, with no basis in the Constitution.
I. RETAKING: WARRANT AND POST REARREST DETENTION
The warrant for rearrest of a parolee may be issued only by the Federal
Parole Board.6 The Fourth Circuit has adopted the view that the rearrest
5. The 1930 revision (Act of May 13, 1930, 46 Stat. 272) left the requirement of a
hearing unchanged, but consolidated the several bodies into one federal Parole Board,
and, in effect, removed the Attorney General from any involvement in such proceedings.
A significant change was made in the 1940 revision (Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 692)
which provided that the "opportunity to appear" might be before an individual Board
member or an examiner appointed by the Board instead of before the whole body. For
purposes of this study, the most relevant current sections of the Federal Criminal Code
(Title 18 U.S.C.) are 4205 and 4207.
Section 4205 provides:
A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his
parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof and within
the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. The unexpired term of
imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the date he is returned
to the custody of the Attorney General under said warrant, and the time the pris-
oner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve.
Section 4207 provides:
A prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole shall be given
an opportunity to appear before the Board, a member thereof, or an examiner desig-
nated by the Board.
The Board may then, or at any time in its discretion, revoke the order of parole
and terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof.
If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so terminated, the said
prisoner may be required to serve all or any part of the remainder of the term for
which he was sentenced.
6. The parole statute, section 4205, requires that the warrant state the facts of the
parolee's original imprisonment and subsequent release, and recite that a member of the
parole board had received sufficient evidence to issue a warrant. The cases of Nave v.
Bell, 180 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1950) and Hamilton v. Hunter, 65 F. Supp. 319 (D. Kan.
1946) stand for the proposition that a warrant is "issued" within the meaning of section
4205 when it has been signed by an authorized member of the Parole Board. Thus, if it
has been "issued" close to the end of the maximum term of the parolee, but not delivered
to the officer who rearrests the parolee until a reasonable time after the end of the term,
the Board does not lose jurisdiction to determine whether he violated his parole. If a
violation is found, even though the determination is made after the time when the
original term was supposed to cease, the violator may have to serve the remainder of the
term. Hamilton v, Hunter, supra at 320. The reason for this is that section 4205 states
that the unexpired term of such a violator "shall .begin to run from the date he is
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warrant is not subject to the same standards of evidence sufficiency as an
original arrest warrant, that its purpose is "merely to restore . . . [the
parolee] to custody and 'to advise him of the purpose of his reincarcera-
tion.' 'IT The court reasoned that the parolee had been protected in the pre-
conviction accusatorial process by the original arrest requirements of the
fourth amendment, that the conviction had suspended his rights under that
amendment, and that he could be treated summarily on rearrest.' Although
parole warrants are not usually tested by the federal standards for original
arrest warrants, there is some judicial control over retaking, as indicated by
the statement of one court that "the parole warrant cannot lawfully issue in
the absence of any information and the issuance of a parole warrant in such
circumstances is arbitrary and capricious and not warranted by law."9 How-
ever, as long as the Board has some information, the determination of its
reliability or sufficiency is usually left to the discretion of the Board.0
The revocation hearing must be held within a reasonable time after the
returned to the custody of the Attorney General ... and the time the prisoner was on
parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve." Accord, Doherty v. United
States, 280 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1960); Melton v. Taylor, 276 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1960).
7. United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1939), citing
Jarman v. United States, 92 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1937). Accord, Hiatt v. Campagna, 178
F.2d 42, 47 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
8. United States v. Dillard, supra note 7. See the discussion of the "prior rights theory"
of the nature of parole at note 18 infra.
9. United States ex rel. De Lucia v. O'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. I1. 1948),
aff'd, 178 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. dismissed, 340 U.S. 886 (1950). (Court's
emphasis.)
In Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), the
court adverted to a regulation adopted by the Board which states that a warrant will
issue on "satisfactory evidence." This, coupled with the court's construction of section
4205, was taken to mean that there is some standard of sufficiency or reliability of evi-
dence to support a warrant; but this standard is, as is the very power of the Board to
issue warrants, derived from Congress and not from the Constitution.
It is equally clear that in issuing a warrant the Board or its member makes only a
tentative or preliminary evaluation finding to the effect that reasonable grounds or
cause appears to justify a belief that the parole conditions have been violated. This
phrase can be analogized to the processes by which a criminal arrest warrant issues
although Congress evinced no intent to require precisely the same formalities and
safeguards as to those contained in the Constitution for criminal arrests. Id. at 241.
10. E.g., (Fifth): Fox v. Sanford, 123 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1941). (Seventh): United
States ex rel. De Lucia v. O'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d
876 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. dismissed, 340 U.S. 886 (1950). (Ninth): Rogoway v.
Warden, 122 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 315 U.S. 808 (1941); Lopez v.
Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). (Tenth): Freedman v. Looney, 210 F.2d
56 (10th Cir. 1954); Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1937). (D.C.):
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 240-41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
See also cases cited notes 57-58 infra and accompanying text.
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parolee's rearrest,11 and, because detention during a period of unreasonable
delay is illegal, habeas corpus will lie during that period.1 2 However, if the
parolee fails to object until his hearing is held, and a violation is established,
his custody from that time is legal. Therefore habeas corpus is unavailable
unless the delay prevented him from receiving a fair hearing."
H. THE REVOCATiON HEARNG
A. Nature of the Hearing
It has been uniformly held1 that the hearing to which the parolee is en-
titled under section 4207 of the Federal Criminal Code may be conducted
informally without the full procedural requirements of the Constitution for
11. United States ex rel. Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 846 (1961); Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742, 744 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
12. Buono v. Kenton, supra note 11, at 536.
13. Habeas corpus will lie after the hearing only if the delay made certain evidence
unavailable or in some other way caused an unfair hearing. Ibid.
14. The federal courts have usually held that any procedural safeguard employed at
any revocation hearing-whether for parole or probation-has merely a statutory, not
a constitutional basis. Mr. Justice Cardozo's dictum in the leading case of Escoe v. Zerbst,
295 U.S. 490 (1939), is usually cited to substantiate this view: "[W~e do not accept the
petitioner's contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any
statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of
a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress
may impose." Id. at 492-93. Some cases cited hereafter deal with probation or condi-
tional release, but the courts cite them as authority in cases dealing with parole practices.
The court in Hyser v. Reed, infra note 15, at 236 n.7, declared that the probation and
parole revocation situations were analogous because traditional due process procedures
applicable prior to conviction were not fully required in either situation.
Only one federal case, Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941), has
explicitly relied on the constitutional argument, and it is questionable authority because it
misquoted and misapplied the Escoe decision, upon which it had relied:
The comments of Justice Cardozo in Escoe v. Zerbst related expressly to rights
created by federal statute. This language was appropriated and applied in the
Fleenor case as if it had been written upon the constitutional issue. For some
reason, the court, in the Fleenor case, ignored the fact that the United States
Supreme Court had expressly rejected the petitioner's contention of a constitutional
right to a hearing . . . . Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 438-39, 229 P.2d 633,
646 (1951).
The Sixth Circuit in Fleenor used the language of Escoe but disregarded the conclusions
reached therein.
Other cases which have considered this issue have indicated that procedural safeguards
employed at a parole revocation hearing have a statutory, non-constitutional basis. E.g.,
(Second): United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689 (D. Conn.
1960). (Fourth): Jarman v. United States, 92 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1937); Rowe v.
Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1935). Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md.
1962); Mac Aboy v. Klecka, 22 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1938). (Fifth): Hiatt v. Cam-
pagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880
(1950); Bowers v. Dishong, 103 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1939). (Sixth): Poole v. Stevens,
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a criminal proceeding. In Hyser v. Reed,"' the District of Columbia Circuit
acknowledged that the procedural safeguards claimed by the appellants
(venue, notice of charge, confrontation, compulsory process for witnesses
and right to counsel) were identical to the requirements of the sixth amend-
ment. However, the sixth amendment was held to be inapplicable to revoca-
tion hearings." The court also stated that the claimed safeguards were not
190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960). (Seventh): Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742,
(S.D. Ind. 1962); United States ex rel. Harris v. Ragen, 81 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1949). (Eighth): Wright v. Settle, 293 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.
1961); Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 822
(1946); Anderson v. Williams, 279 Fed. 822 (8th Cir. 1922), rev'd on other grounds, sub
nom. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923). (Ninth): Burns v. United States, 59 F.2d
721 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 287 U.S. 216 (1932); Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.
Cal. 1959). (D.C.): Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 infra note 15; Robbins v. Reed, 269
F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Martin v. United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542
(D.D.C. 1961); In re Tate, 63 F. Supp. 961 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Fleming v. Tate,
156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The following quote epitomizes the practical considera-
tions that no doubt influence judicial rejection of a constitutional basis for revocation pro-
cedures.
The parolee is still serving a sentence imposed by a court. Many existing statutes
refer to such parolees as being in the legal custody of the institution even though
by an act of grace of the parole board they may be serving the sentence beyond the
confines of the institution. Therefore, no unnecessary obstacles or handicaps
should be placed in the way of a prompt return to the institution whenever such
return is in the interest of the public or the parolee. The decision to return a vio-
lator is administrative rather than judicial and only such checks or limitations
should be set up as are necessary to prevent hasty or ill-considered action ...
The preventative aspect of parole is as vital as the therapeutic one. NATIONAL PRo-
DATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 114-15 (1957).
There is, however, one qualification that must be made to any statement that courts
reject the constitutional basis.
An important distinction to be remembered when speaking of due process of law
as not applying to parole revocation proceedings is that reference is made to pro-
cedural due process and not substantive due process. It cannot be doubted that if a
parole revocation actually lacked substantive due process it would be inherently
defective. Thus, for example, if the parole board's action was based on fraud, bias,
corruption, whim or caprice, it should not stand; nor should it be valid if it was
based solely on rumor with no evidence to support it, or if the Board's action
exceeded statutory authority. These situations would involve a denial of basic
substantive due process .... Urbaniak, Due Process Should Not Be a Requirement
at a Parole Revocation Hearing, 27 Fed. Prob. 46, 49 (June, 1963).
15. 318 F.2d 225, 237-38 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
16. Ibid. One rationale that runs through cases which hold the sixth amendment to
be inapplicable is that a revocation hearing is not a "criminal proceeding" since it does
not determine guilt or innocence of an offense for which a new sentence may be imposed.
The term "criminal proceeding" has been restricted by the courts to the concept of
original guilt adjudication in an adversary proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 563 (1891). The sixth amendment rights afforded the criminal accused have
been associated with adversary criminal proceedings to the exclusion of administrative
hearings, not only of parole hearings (as in Hyser v. Reed, supra note 15, at 237), but
others as well. Thus, in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), the Court held the con-
stitutional right of counsel to be inapplicable to hearings before the Ohio State Fire
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
binding upon the Parole Board through the due process clause of the fifth
amendment." The reasoning of the court synthesized two ideas which regu-
larly appear in federal court denials that a constitutional basis exists for
procedural safeguards at revocation hearings. First, the court reasoned that
parole authorities have granted a form of conditional liberty to an individual
who had forfeited at the time of his conviction the normal constitutional
rights of citizens. Therefore, the parolee may be treated differently8 from
Marshal. Although the Marshal's findings might have provided the basis for criminal
charges against the appellants, the circumstances had not yet crystallized into a "criminal
proceeding." Accord, Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n.16 (1960); Anonymous
v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); cf. United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665, 668 (2d
Cir. 1963); Escute v. Delgado, 282 F.2d 335, 338 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 883
(1960); United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D. Mass. 1955). Thus, in
posing the argument that courts should put factual substance over legal form and desig-
nate as a "criminal proceeding" any hearing which may in fact lead to further penal
sanctions, the parolee will be pressing against the current of a well established body of
law. A further difference between revocation hearings and original criminal proceedings
is pointed out in Note, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 737, 745 (1963): "[The burden of proof at
a hearing is much less than at a criminal trial .... Although the evidence in such a case
may be insufficient to support a conviction, it may be enough for a Board determination
that the accused is no longer a 'good parole risk.'" See also notes 31, 57 infra and
accompanying text.
17. 318 F.2d at 239. But see Rubin, Due Process is Required in Parole Revocation
Hearings, 27 Fed. Prob. 42, 44 (June, 1963); Comment, 28 So. CAL. L. Rav. 158, 167
(1955).
In Note, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 737, 753-54, it is pointed out that procedural due process
is more than a set of safeguards reserved, as are the specific guarantees of the sixth
amendment, for adversary criminal proceedings. It is an index of rules of fair play
designed to prevent arbitrary governmental action in any context, administrative or
otherwise. The court in Hyser rejected the applicability of due process to revocation
hearings, however, because the substantive rights of the parolee had been impaired by
conviction, thus enabling a less strict view of his procedural rights. Id. at 748-53. See
also 17 VAND. L. Rv. 577, 584-87 (1964).
Thus, parole revocation is a unique confrontation between the Government and an
individual. Because of the impaired status of the parolee, the unique relationship en-
gendered by parole, not only the sixth amendment, but procedural due process as well, is
inapplicable to revocation hearings. There is, however, the possibility that other constitu-
tional doctrines may be applicable in spite of the manner in which the courts have
characterized the parole relationship. See authority quoted at end of note 14 supra for
the proposition that the parolee's right to be free from arbitrary and capricious actions
has a touchstone in substantive due process.
18. 318 F.2d at 237-39. The reasoning of the court has elements of four ways the
courts have characterized that "abridged status" of the parolee which makes possible
the position that procedural safeguards at revocation hearings have at most only a statu-
tory, not a constitutional basis.
The argument which has been the strongest of the four historically and is also the most
frequently asserted today is that parole or pardon is an "act of grace," which the convict
has no enforceable right to demand. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1939) (see the dis-
cussion of this case note 14 supra). This position, with variants, has been taken in deci-
sions in most of the federal circuits. E.g., (Second): United States ex rel. McCreary v.
Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689 (D. Conn. 1960). (Fourth): Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp.
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the free citizen because his freedoms have already "been substantially
945, 951 (D. Md. 1962). (Fifth): Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950). (Seventh): United States ex rel.
Harris v. Ragen, 81 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 177 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1949).
(Eighth): Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 822
(1946). (Ninth): Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). (Tenth):
Freedman v. Looney, 210 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1954). (D.C.): Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d
848 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See also Ex parte Houghton, 49 Ore. 232, 89 Pac. 801 (1907);
Urbaniak, Due Process Should Not Be a Requirement at a Parole Revocation Hearing,
27 Fed. Prob. 46, 49 (June, 1963). This "act of grace" theory has resisted attack more
successfully than the other three. But see Comment, 28 So. CAL. L. Rav. 167 (1955).
According to a second theory, the "contract theory," a "parole, like every other pardon,
is subject to rejection or acceptance by the convict. He has an unfettered election .... "
Acceptance of the parole is treated as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself,
had expressly contracted and agreed that upon determination of a violation, he would
be reconfined. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 38, 26 So. 146, 147 (1899). Accord, Wiles v.
Board of Probation & Parole, 191 Kan. 705, 383 P.2d 969 (1963). The fact that a
revocation hearing is guaranteed in the federal system by section 4207 takes on added
significance; the statute is incorporated into the terms of the contract. See Bowers v.
Dishong, 103 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1939). The contract analogy is strengthened by the
corollary rule that the conditions of a parole must not be illegal, immoral or impossible
to perform. Ex Parte Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 146 Pac. 1009 (1915). In some cases, the
contract theory has been combined with the previously discussed "act of grace" theory,
and the resulting proposition has been that parole is a privilege bestowed by the govern-
ment, but the granting of a parole to any individual convict is a contract. In re Saucier,
122 Vt. 208, 167 A.2d 368 (1961). Cases in two federal circuits have explicitly used
the contract theory to support the position that procedural safeguards have only a
statutory basis. (Fourth): Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 951-52 (D. Md. 1962).
(Fifth) : Bowers v. Dishong, 103 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1939). The contrary position is that
a convicted person cannot, since he has been condemned, make terms with the granting
authority. Burns v. United States, 59 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
Cf. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927). The Supreme Court states in Biddle,
Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's
consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare,
not his consent, determines what shall be done. . . . No one doubts that [for] a
reduction of the terms of imprisonment . . . the convict's consent is not required.
Id. at 486-87.
While the first two views assume as a basic fact that the parolee has somehow changed
his status by being conditionally freed, the third view, which might be called the "exten-
sion of prison walls theory," takes a directly contrary position: "A prisoner released on
parole is not a free man.... [T]he granting of the parole does not change his status as
a prisoner...." People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 507-08, 297 P.2d 451, 456-57
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956). One state court has stated that a parole merely "'pushes back
the prison walls' and allows him the wider freedom of movement while serving his sen-
tene .... He is ... serving his sentence outside of the prison rather than within the
walls." McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945). This theory has been
attacked as a "legal fiction" since the parolee's status is "one of liberty, albeit a condi-
tional liberty." Rubin, Due Process Is Required in Parole Revocation Hearings, 27 Fed.
Prob. 42, 45 (June, 1963), and it has not been widely adopted by the federal courts.
However, two Fourth Circuit cases viewed as controlling an older Supreme Court decision
employing this theory. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923); Jarman v. United
States, 92 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1937); Rowe v. Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1935).
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abridged in accord with the requirements of due process." 9 Secondly, this
abridgment of status has struck, in the contemplation of the law, an identity,
rather than an adversity of interests between the parolee and the Board: the
parolee's position is analogous to that of a ward being corrected by a guar-
dian who has the ward's best interest at heart."0 The analogy may be loose,
but it sufficed to convince the court that there was lacking that clash of in-
terests which characterizes a "criminal proceeding."
The "prior rights" theory is based on the premise that since the parolee had the full
benefit of constitutional guarantees at his original trial, there is a suspension of these
guarantees until his term has been served.
[ihe person being dealt with is a convict ... [who] has already been seized in a
constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him,
been tried by a jury ... and by them convicted of crime .... In respect of that
crime and his attitude before the law after the conviction of it, he is not a citizen,
nor entitled to invoke the organic safeguards which hedge about the citizen's liberty.
Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 40, 26 So. 146, 148 (1899).
It has also been stated, in Urbaniak, Due Process Should Not Be a Requirement at a
Parole Revocation Hearing, 27 Fed. Prob. 46, 50 (June, 1963) that:
A parolee who has breached the conditions of his parole has the status of an
escaped prisoner. He was already given full constitutional protection at the trial
when he was convicted. After conviction, his constitutional presumption of inno-
cence ceased. The constitutional rights extended to one accused of crime in the
first instance should not be extended to one whose punishment, already legally im-
posed, is now to be enforced.
Although more forthright, and thus more persuasive, this "prior rights" theory previous
to Hyser v. Reed, supra, had been mentioned only in earlier cases from the fourth and
sixth circuits. Fleenor v. Hammond, 28 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Ky. 1939), aff'd, 116 F.2d
982 (6th Cir. 1941). The appellate court did not use the "prior rights" theory, but based
the procedural safeguards in question on the constitutional guarantees. See note 14
supra. United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1939).
Federal courts have thus almost unanimously (see cases cited note 14 supra) rejected
the alternative theory proposed by some writers that the federal constitution provides
procedural safeguards to parolees. These writers apparently believe that the granting of
parole has given the convict the right to live in the free community, and that society
should be sufficiently concerned to require regular judicial proceedings before this liberty
is revoked; thus, failure to provide an alleged violator with an adequate opportunity to
explain his conduct is contrary to traditional American ideas of justice. See Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissent); Weihofen, Revoking Probation,
Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing, 32 J. Caum. L., C. & P.S. 531 (1942); Note, 65
H v. L. REv. 309 (1951); Note, 41 ILL. L. Rxv. 277 (1946); Comment, 28 So. CAL.
L. REv. 158 (1955).
19. 318 F.2d at 239.
20. The Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Board operate from the basic premise
that prisoners placed in their custody are to be rehabilitated and restored to useful
lives as soon as in the Board's judgment that transition can be safely made. This is
plainly what Congress intends. Thus there is a genuine identity of interest if not
purpose in the prisoner's desire to be released and the Board's policy to grant re-
lease as soon as possible. Here there is not the attitude of adverse, conflicting objec-
tives as between the parolee and the Board inherent between prosecution and de-
fense in a criminal case. Here we do not have pursuer and quarry but a relation-
ship partaking of parens patriae. In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking
parole occupies the role of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not
as punishment but for misuse of the privilege. 318 F.2d at 237.
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The majority of tribunals have further facilitated the informality of revo-
cation hearings by holding that the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 which
requires federal agencies to employ due process procedures at their hearings,
is not applicable to the Parole Board. The principal reason for this given by
the courts is that the act expressly excludes from coverage agencies such as
the Parole Board whose action is by law committed to agency discretion.22
As indicated in the subsections which follow, the District of Columbia
Circuit has narrowed the discretion of the Board by holding that the parole
statute requires compliance with several procedural safeguards at revoca-
tion hearings. This enabled the court in Robbins v. Reed" to reject the
majority position24 and hold that at least that portion of the Administrative
Procedure Act25 which provides for judicial review of agency action governs
revocation hearings.2" However, this circuit has also held that the portion
of the act which requires certain agencies to employ procedural safeguards
at their hearings is inapplicable to revocation hearings because the Board is
not covered by the language of that portion of the act: "[T]he Board does
not adjudicate, nor is it required to hold hearings, in the sense that those
words are employed in the Administrative Procedure Act. ' 27 Thus, the
safeguards that are required by this circuit are read into the language of
section 4207 of the parole statute and are not those listed in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
B. Jury Trial
The issue of the propriety or necessity of a jury trial on the question of a
parole or probation violation sometimes arises in the state courts. The usual
position has been that "the prisoner is not entitled to the verdict of the jury
as a matter of right. According to the course of common law practice" the
21. Section 6, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004-06 (1958).
22. E.g., (Fourth): Bozell v. United States, 199 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1952). (Fifth):
Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
340 U.S. 880 (1950). (Seventh): Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742, 744 (S.D. Ind.
1962).
23. 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
24. The court in rejecting the majority position stated: "We assume the discretion
applies to the action taken [by the Board] as well as to its timing; but when revocation
ensues upon a failure to comply with . . . procedural rights there is no discretion to
revoke parole." Id. at 244.
25. Section 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
26. 269 F.2d at 244. Accord, Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See
notes 59-72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique procedure on
appeal engendered by these holdings.
27. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
28. Generally no reference is made in federal cases to the common law practice, as
there is, on occasion, in the state courts. The procedural rights of the federal parolee
stand or fall generally on the courts' interpretation of section 4207.
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only issue that must be tried by a jury is whether the prisoner is the same
person who was convicted.1
29
The question of a parolee's right to jury trial in a revocation hearing has
never been explicitly answered by a federal court. The statutory phrase
"opportunity to appear" may be suggestive of an intent of Congress to bor-
row from procedural due process the proposition that an individual's appear-
ance is not effective unless he is afforded the right to be represented by
counsel or to present evidence at a hearing. But it seems likely that federal
courts would follow the usual state position because the right to a jury has
been peculiarly associated with judicial trials and it would take a consider-
able step to say that Congress intended to extend the right to an administra-
tive parole hearing. Until Congress expressly directs that juries will be
employed at revocation hearings, or the courts decide that the hearings are
"criminal proceedings" subject to the mandates of the sixth amendment, the
parolee may not expect a jury at revocation hearings.
C. Evidence Presentation
The federal courts have allowed the Board to consider forms of informa-
tion that would be excluded at judicial trials under rules of evidence."0
Because the Board may rely on affidavits, letters, telegrams, prison records
and other communications, it possesses the authority to compile an exhaus-
tive brochure reflecting many aspects of conduct and personality that are
withheld from the trier of original guilt."
29. State ex rel. O'Connor v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 140, 54 N.W. 1065, 1067 (1893).
30. E.g., (Fifth): Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 792 (1947). (Seventh): Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind.
1962). (Ninth): Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). (Tenth):
Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1937). (D.C.): Fleming v. Tate, 156
F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (dictum).
31. This flexibility affords greater protection to the alleged violator than would
be allowed in an adversary proceeding with conventional rules of evidence. It per-
mits the Board to consider all relevant information which may be helpful to the
parolee. To hold that compulsory process is constitutionally required would imply
that revocation hearings are comparable to criminal prosecutions rather than to
administrative processes within the framework of prisoner rehabilitation and penal
administration. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 240 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 957 (1963). (Footnote omitted.)
One district court has pointed out that the Board performs a different function than
the trier in a criminal case. Instead of formally adjudicating guilt by coordinating an
isolated set of facts with the elements of a substantive crime, the Board's inquiry must
be designed to reveal, in the final analysis, whether the accused violator has indicated
that he is no longer a good parole risk. Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749, 751 (M.D.
Pa. 1960). "That determination presupposes an informal type of conference far removed
from the technical ritual of a trial." Ibid. The proposition that the ultimate question is
one of parole risk is strengthened by the statement in Hyser v. Reed, supra at 238, that
if it is found the parolee violated a condition of his parole, "the Board has discretion to
continue his parole notwithstanding a violation."
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The affirmative discretion to entertain evidence does not necessarily
mean that the Board may arbitrarily ignore information offered by the
parolee.12 The parolee certainly has a right to appear in person and to hear
and personally answer the charges against him. This right may be deduced
directly from the phrase "opportunity to appear" in the parole statute.3 In
addition, holdings in the second3' and District of Columbia35 circuits have
construed this phrase as granting to the parolee the right to present real or
testimonial evidence in his own behalf. However, at this point the phrase
appears to be exhausted as a source of rights relating to evidence presenta-
tion. The District of Columbia Circuit, which has taken the lead in statu-
tory construction, has held that "Congress has not invested the Parole Board
with subpoena power . . . [which] is not an inherent attribute of agency
authority. We cannot read it into the statute." 6 Thus, the right to witnesses
encompasses only the presentation of voluntary witnesses. 7 The District of
32. United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D. Conn.
1960).
33. Ibid.
34. United States ex rel. Frederick v. Kenton, 308 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1962).
35. Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d
848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
36. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 239-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963). Accord, Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Martin v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1961); Poole v. Stevens, 190
F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960). In United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190
F. Supp. 689, 691 (D. Conn. 1960), the court stated:
Revoking of parole, like the granting of it ... is not, under the statute, intended
to be determined by means of the full dress adversary proceedings of a trial with
right to counsel, right to summon witnesses, right of confrontation, etc. The words
"opportunity to appear" do not call for a hearing of this sort. It is not lack of
administrative due process that the prisoner is not entitled to have witnesses sum-
moned and heard or that he may not appear with counsel.
37. Sklar, in Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 175, 190 (1964), has interpreted Gibson v. Markley, Poole v.
Stevens, and United States v. Kenton, all cited supra note 36, as denying the right to
present voluntary witnesses as well as the right to compulsory process. However, Poole
does not unequivocally refer to voluntary witnesses when, in construing the phrase "oppor-
tunity to appear," the opinion states "that the right to counsel and witnesses at a parole
violation hearing is not encompassed by this language ... ." 190 F. Supp. at 941. The
primary issue in the case was the right to counsel and this cryptic reference to witnesses
appears to be dictum.
The court in Gibson, in developing its exposition of the informality of revocation hear-
ings, cited Poole for the proposition that "there is no right to have witnesses appear at
the hearing." 205 F. Supp. at 743. However, this also appears to be dictum. The precise
holding was that since the parolee had not yet taken advantage of an offer of the Board
to give him a new hearing at which he would be allowed to have witnesses appear in his
behalf, he was not entitled to habeas corpus.
In Kenton, the only discussion of witnesses was a denial of the right to compulsory
process, which was qualified by the court's view that if the parolee takes the initiative
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Columbia Circuit has also held that the parolee has no right to confront and
cross-examine persons who have supplied the Board with information,"8 and
that the parolee is not entitled to a pre-hearing discovery of the Board's
evidence. 9
This circuit has taken the lead among the federal circuits in clarifying and
extending the rights of the parolee relating to the presentation of evidence.
This is also true of its holdings on the right to counsel. However, in taking
these progressive positions, that circuit has relied solely upon the intent of
Congress. Its unequivocal rejection ° of the proposition that revocation is
enough like original conviction to be subject to the constitutional require-
ments for criminal proceedings 4' has firmly fixed the status of the Parole
Board as an administrative agency, subject only to the will of Congress and
to the requirement that it avoid the capricious abuse of discretion. 2
D. Counsel
Perhaps the most controversial question is whether the parolee may be
represented by counsel at revocation hearings. A negative answer was uni-
formly given by federal courts before 1946. In that year the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Fleming v. Tate," construed the phrase
"opportunity to appear" in the parole provision of the District of Columbia
Code (which at that time was worded similarly to the federal parole statute)
as impliedly including the right to personally retained counsel. The district
court had adverted to the evolving character of the law of parole:
and makes known sources of information to the Board, the Board should investigate those
sources. Thus, these three cases do not unequivocally establish the point.
Sklar, supra at 191 nn.128-30 does give supplementary information suggesting that the
Board in practice is not receptive to voluntary witnesses. This, however, must be read
in the light of the offer made by the Board in the Gibson case. The inference from that
case is that the Board hears, albeit grudgingly, voluntary witnesses; and in the absence
of unequivocal authority to the contrary, it may be said that the clearest case authority
establishes that the Board must hear voluntary witnesses at least when the parolee has
taken the initiative and presented them to the Board.
38. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963);
accord, Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
39. Hyser v. Reed, supra note 38, at 239.
40. Ibid.
41. See notes 14-18 supra for a discussion of the constitutional issues.
42. See authority quoted at the end of note 14 supra for a suggestion that the prohibi-
tion of arbitrary and capricious action is based on substantive, as distinguished from
procedural, due process.
43. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Following this case, Congress amended the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code to expressly provide that a parolee may be "represented by




The progress in the direction of a fair and humane administration of
criminal justice has been in large part marked by an extension of the
right of counsel ... [I]t seems ironical and anomalous that a parole
board representing in itself one of the most recent and progressive ad-
vances in the administration of criminal law should be the last to cling
to the outmoded denial of the right of representation by counsel . . .
[which is] no less important in an administrative hearing on revocation
of parole than it is in a judicial proceeding."
The division between the District of Columbia and the other circuits with
regard to the right to counsel has been sharply defined since 1947, when
Congress revised the District of Columbia Code."5 Added to that code was a
provision that a parolee may be represented by personally retained counsel
at his revocation hearing. However, when Congress re-enacted the Federal
Criminal Code in 1948, no similar provision was written into the appropriate
section."" As might be expected, the federal courts have reacted differently
to the fact of that omission. Some of the courts4 ' have regarded this as con-
clusive evidence of legislative intent:
[I]n failing to make statutory provisions giving a right of counsel under
the Federal statute one year after providing for such a right in the Dis-
trict statute would seem to be a clear indication of its deliberate inten-
tion to provide different procedures for parole violators subject to the
Federal statute.4"
In 1946, the District of Columbia Circuit in Fleming v. Tate,49 was con-
struing only the District of Columbia Code as providing the right to be
represented by retained counsel. In 1957 this circuit read into the 1947
revision of this code the further requirement that the parolee be advised
of this right."0 Two years later, in the first important case to arise under the
44. In re Tate, 63 F. Supp. 961, 963 (D.D.C. 1946), af'd sub nom. Fleming v.
Tate, supra note 43. Accord, Barnes v. Reed, 301 F.2d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Reed
v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
45. An Act to Reorganize the System of Parole of Prisoners Convicted in the District
of Columbia, 61 Stat. 379 (1947). Fleming v. Tate, supra note 43, was incorporated into
this section.
46. For a discussion of section 4207 see note 3 supra.
47. E.g., (Second): United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689
(D. Conn. 1960). (Third): Washington v. Hagan, 183 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Pa. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961). (Sixth): Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.
Mich. 1960). (Ninth): Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
48. Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749, 751 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
49. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
50. Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Accord, Glenn v. Reed, 289 F.2d
462 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Robbins v. Reed,
269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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judicial review procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act,"1 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit took a further step and construed the Federal
Criminal Code by analogy to its construction of the District Code, as grant-
ing the right to have retained counsel at the hearing, and also as requiring
notification of this right to the parolee."2 However, when faced with a claim
that counsel should be appointed for indigent parolees, the court balked,
reiterating that the advances made with respect to retained counsel had been
constructions of the intent of Congress, with no basis in the sixth amend-
ment. 3
No other federal circuit has been persuaded to advance as far as the
District of Columbia Circuit. In fact, since 1946, courts in several circuits
have reaffirmed their denial of the right to retained counsel at revocation
hearings.5" The position of the Supreme Court remains unclear because it
has denied certiorari when presented with the issue.5
III. JUDICAL REvmw
With regard to the scope of appeal, the majority position is that judicial
review of the Board's revocation of a parole is limited to the question of
whether the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously," and cannot be ex-
tended to an inquiry into the reliability or sufficiency of the information upon
51. Section 10, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). See text accompanying
notes 59-72 for a discussion of this procedure as utilized in the District of Columbia.
52. Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals subsequently followed this lead and read into the federal statute the
further right to present witnesses at the hearing. Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776
(D.C. Cir. 1961). See text accompanying note 35 supra.
53. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237-38 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963). Rule 44, FED. R. CRm. P. provides for appointment of counsel for a defendant
when he appears in court, which language is not comprehensive of administrative pro-
ceedings. See Martin v. United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542, 543 (D.D.C.
1961). The court in Martin also pointed out that as a practical matter it is virtually
impossible to obtain attorneys for appointment because most of the federal penitentiaries
are removed from large cities.
54. E.g., (Second): United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689
(D. Conn. 1960). (Third): Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
(Sixth): Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960). (Seventh): Gibson v.
Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962); United States ex rel. Harris v. Ragen,
81 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 177 F.2d 303 (1949). (Ninth): Lopez v. Madigan,
174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). See Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 822 (1947).
55. Washington v. Hagan, 183 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Pa.), afJ'd, 287 F.2d 332 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text for
discussion of why the sixth amendment is inapplicable.
56. See also text accompanying note 9 supra.
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which the revocation decision was based. 7 It has also been held that there
arises a presumption of the regularity of the Board's administrative pro-
ceedings,' so that to secure a reversal the parolee must prove that arbitrary
conduct did in fact occur.
The traditional procedure for appeal from a determination by the Parole
Board has been the petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the district
court nearest the prison in which the parolee has been reincarcerated."
However, in recent years another means of obtaining review of the Board's
action has developed. The District of Columbia Circuit" has applied the
section of the Administrative Procedure Act," which provides judicial review
57. (Third): Bass v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Pa. 1943). (Fifth): Fox v.
Sanford, 123 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1941). (Sixth): Clark v. Stevens, 291 F.2d 388 (6th
Cir. 1961). (Seventh): Gibson v. Marldey, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
(Ninth): Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). See In re Tate, 63
F. Supp. 961 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
But see Clark v. Surprenant, 94 F.2d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1938) (discussed note 79 infra).
Of course, if the Board possesses no reliable information, issuance of the warrant and any
further revocation proceedings will be deemed arbitrary and capricious. United States
ex rel. De Lucia v. O'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 876
(7th Cir. 1949), cert. dismissed, 340 U.S. 886 (1950); Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d
40 (10th Cir. 1937) (dictum). See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
There is no right to a court trial on the issue of revocation of parole. Wright v.
Settle, 293 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1961). As stated in Washington v. Hagan, supra,
287 F.2d at 334: "[The] matter of whether a prisoner is a good risk for release on
parole or has shown himself not to be a good risk, is a disciplinary matter which by
its very nature should be left in the hands of those charged with the responsibility
for deciding the question." Gibson v. Markley, supra at 743.
The variance in functions performed by the Board and the courts is further pointed
out in note 31 supra. The inference that may be drawn is that courts feel a judicial
determination should not be substituted for the "administrative expertise" of the Board.
See also text accompanying note 78 infra. The courts appear to have restricted their
function to a supervisory one to prevent the abuse of discretion. It is possible, however,
that the judicial abhorrence of arbitrary and capricious action has a touchstone in sub-
stantive, as distinguished from procedural, due process. See authority quoted at the end
of note 14 supra.
58. (Third): Walton v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Pa. 1943). (Fifth): Harrell
v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1934). (Seventh): United States ex ret. Harris v.
Ragen, 177 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1949). (Tenth): Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d 40
(10th Cir. 1937).
59. (Third): Bass v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Pa. 1943). (Seventh): Gibson
v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962); United States ex ret. Harris v.
Ragen, 81 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. I1. 1949); United States ex ret. De Lucia v. O'Dono-
van, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Il1. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. dis.
missed, 340 U.S. 886 (1950). (Ninth): Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.
Cal. 1959). (Tenth): Freedman v. Looney, 210 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1954); Christianson
v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1937). (D.C.): Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re Tate, 63 F. Supp.
961 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
60. Notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
61. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
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of agency decisions, to parole revocation hearings. Thus, a person whose
parole has been revoked may appeal to "any court of competent jurisdic-
tion""2 and may specify a declaratory judgment63 as the type of relief desired.
In Robbins v. Reed,64 and in Hurley v. Reed,6" the District of Columbia
Circuit identified the courts in that circuit as being of "competent jurisdic-
tion" for an appeal; the Board is based in the District, satisfying the venue
requirement. In Hurley, the court said that although an action might have
been brought in the district court nearest the federal prison in which the
hearing had been held, the District was perhaps a preferable forum because
of geographical proximity to the central records of the Board.
In Robbins, the court indicated that one of the influences that led it to
assume jurisdiction over these appeals was a prior holding of the Fifth
Circuit! which had declared that a petition for mandamus, mandatory in-
junction, or declaratory judgment to the District of Columbia courts under
the review section of the Administrative Procedure Act was the only proper
remedy and that habeas corpus petitions would no longer be entertained in
the Fifth Circuit."7
The most recent case6" under these relatively new appeal procedures in-
volved eight petitioners whose cases were consolidated for hearing before the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Three of these parolees had been
reincarcerated and given hearings in other circuits whose courts had not
previously passed on the specific question of whether appeal from Parole
Board decisions should be by petition for writ of habeas corpus or for
declaratory judgment, or, if the latter, in what jurisdiction. Still another
petitioner in this case was appealing from the Second Circuit, which had
entertained a habeas corpus petition the year before00 All these parolees
were heard and treated as parties to the case in which their revocations were
reviewed.
Thus, it appears that whether or not the court of appeals for a given
62. 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
(b) The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in
the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action.., in any
court of competent jurisdiction....
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
64. 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
65. 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
66. Howell v. Hiatt, 199 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1952).
67. Older cases in the Fourth Circuit have also suggested that mandamus, rather than
habeas corpus, is the proper remedy. United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1939); United States ex rel. Rowe v. Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 573 (1935).
68. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
69. United States ex rel. Frederick v. Kenton, 308 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1962).
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circuit has ruled specifically that it will disallow appeals from adverse de-
cisions on petitions for habeas corpus, the District of Columbia courts will
take jurisdiction of suits for mandamus or declaratory judgment against the
Parole Board. This will not necessarily eliminate the alternative habeas
corpus remedy in the circuits of reincarceration if it is not there specifically
forbidden.70 But this circuit may have paved the way for its future monopoli-
zation of parole cases: "Since . . . the construction of the federal . . .
statute ... is notably more liberal in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia than in other federal Circuits, reimprisoned parolees have
sought relief from the courts of the District."'" With few exceptions,"2 all
recent cases have arisen in the District of Columbia circuit.
CONCLUSION
The Parole Board, possessing information that a violation has occurred,
may issue a rearrest warrant. There is indication in the cases that some ob-
jective standards of information sufficiency exist to guide the Board in
making the rearrest decision; i.e., the Board must possess "reliable" or "satis-
factory" information upon which to base the decision. Presumably, in finding
that a violation has in fact occurred, the Board must meet a higher standard
of information sufficiency to support revocation than is necessary to support
the initial rearrest decision. However, this is only presumed, since the courts
do not address themselves specifically to sufficiency standards which guide
the revocation decision. This is true because the courts have apparently
overlooked a distinction between the two revocation functions of the Board.
Since the Board is empowered to revoke only if it has some information
that a violation of parole has occurred, its first function is to inquire into the
facts to determine whether there has been a violation. Secondly, if a viola-
tion is found, the Board must then deduce from the available information
whether the parolee has shown himself to be such a bad parole risk that his
parole should be revoked. 3
There is some justification for saying that as it is making this latter evalua-
tion, the Board is not accommodating a direct clash of interests between
70. Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961) specifically indicated that these
alternatives were still available to the petitioner.
71. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 175, 189 (1964).
72. United States ex rel. Frederick v. Kenton, 308 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1962) is an
exception. It is quite possible that the petitioner was willing to appeal in that circuit
rather than spend extra time and expense in petitioning the District of Columbia circuit
simply because he was confident that, in all probability, the second circuit court would
also rule in his favor on this particular issue (presentation of relevant evidence).
73. See note 31 supra.
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accuser and accused as does the trier of original guilt; that the Board's final
decision must be made primarily within the context of the rehabilitative
process, rather than in the conventional criminal trial atmosphere of a clash
between the safety of the sovereign and the interest of the accused to remain
at liberty. 4 Thus, as it is making this final decision, the Board is said to fall
without the purview of constitutional provisions that prescribe mandatory
safeguards for adversary criminal proceedings."5 This has freed the courts to
speculate on the practical desirability of requiring certain of these safeguards
at revocation hearings. As a result, the courts may entertain arguments that
the allowance of these safeguards would cause the Board to be flooded with
petitions for rehearing, aggravating its overcrowded docket,"' or that if the
power to revoke is circumscribed by procedural requirements, the Board
might be less willing to grant paroles in the first instance.7 The District of
Columbia Circuit, taking the lead among the federal circuits, has selectively
imposed traditional safeguards upon the Board by reliance upon the intent
of Congress. But that circuit has also proclaimed that it will not go so far
in this direction as to impair the Board's evaluative expertise.
The basis for Board action in revoking parole must have a rational and
legitimate relationship to whether the parolee is good parole risk.
What constitutes such cause is left by Congress to the discretion of the
Board and judicial review of its exercise is very limited. The functions
of the Parole Board involve the application of blended concepts of
criminology, penology, and psychology, and if the doctrine of "adminis-
trative expertise" should carry weight anywhere it should do so in this
area. It is worth repeating that the Board which revokes parole is the
same Board which grants parole; its whole orientation is to release
prisoners and to keep them at liberty."
These arguments can be made to sound plausible enough with regard to
the evaluative function of the Board. However, to extend them to the
Board's fact-finding function, as the courts have done, is harder to justify.
Admittedly, there is an overlap between the two functions; Board members
probably are forming parole risk evaluations as they are hearing evidence
which, in and of itself, may or may not establish a prima facie case of parole
violation. But since there is no Board discretion to revoke when there has
74. Notes 14, 16, 17-20, 31, 57 supra and accompanying text.
75. See People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912). See also Ex parte
Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952). Federal and state parole officers did not
indicate at a 1956 national conference that they favored a constitutionalized procedure.
NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 114-16
(1957). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.23, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
76. See Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749, 752 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
77. See 9 W. Rns. L. Rav. 234, 237 (1958).
78. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 242 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
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been no specific violation, the inquiry into the truth or falsity of the informa-
tion before the Board must be somewhat separate and distinct. This fact-
finding function is more strictly analogous to the adjudication of original
guilt. For example, in either instance if the accused knows of witnesses who
are unwilling to testify but could establish his alibi, the need for compulsory
process is identical. Yet the courts have failed to draw the distinction be-
tween these two functions of the Parole Board. They have held that once
some information of a violation is presented, the determination of its reli-
ability or sufficiency is left to Board discretion, and that the constitutional
guarantees of confrontation, counsel and compulsory process are unavailable
to the parolee who seeks to challenge the information. To reach this con-
clusion, the courts have, unfortunately, utilized the same arguments applied
to the evaluative function of the Board.
As a practical matter, this lack of standards may present no problem in the
usual case. The conditions of parole curtail activities that are considered
quite normal among some quarters of the population. No doubt many rev-
ocations are occasioned by recurrent indulgence in these activities-if the
parolee goes back to one of his old ways, he is probably likely to resurrect
the whole lot of his former habits. In such a situation, the parolee would
probably choose to challenge the Board's decision by saying that in spite of a
pattern of small infractions he remained a good parole risk, rather than
blatantly denying the truth of the facts asserted against him. If this is the
situation in most revocation cases, it is not surprising that courts, whose
attention has thus been called to the evaluative function, would use language
describing the discretion of the Board with respect to that function, which
comprehends, perhaps inadvertently, the fact-finding function. But this
failure to distinguish the two functions has left unprotected the parolee
accused of one serious violation. This situation centers about the fact-finding
function because there may be room for doubt that a technical violation has
occurred. So far as the opinions indicate, the courts rarely face this situation
in which parole has been revoked because of disputed facts indicating one
serious violation. However, when they do face it, the courts are forced into
strained efforts to distinguish the cases pertaining to the evaluative func-
tion.7 Their ability to distinguish on the basis of Board functions has been
79. In Clark v. Surprenant, 94 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1938), the court was faced with a
situation in which parole had been revoked because the parolee had left the Northern
District of Ohio. But apparently he did so with the advice of his parole advisor.
Here we have an altogether different situation. The testimony is convincing that
the appellee did not intentionally or at all violate his parole and the full term of
his sentence had therefore expired as completely satisfied.... [T]he court not only
had the right but the duty to determine whether appellee had violated the condi-
tions of his release. Id. at 972.
The court reached this result by emphasizing that this was not the usual conditional
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precluded by the numerous holdings which use arguments applicable to the
evaluative function, but reach the result that as long as it has some informa-
tion, the Board, in its fact-finding capacity, has uncontrolled discretion to
determine its sufficiency or reliability.
A possible solution lies in the use of a bifurcated revocation hearing: the
Board would at the initial stage make a factual determination whether there
has been a violation of the conditions of parole. If the facts are disputed, the
accused violator would be afforded those safeguards prescribed by the Con-
stitution for such factual determinations in criminal proceedings. The Board,
of course, has discretion to evaluate and assess the evidence presented; if no
violation is established, the parolee would be re-paroled and returned to the
community. However, if the Board rules that a violation did in fact occur, a
second, less formal stage of the revocation hearing would be initiated. The
crux of the inquiry at this phase of the procedures has shifted from truth or
falsity of the evidence of a violation to the evaluation of the parolee as a
parole risk-just what is his rehabilitation potential? Due to the subjective
nature of such inquiry, the arguments presently advanced by courts which
deny the traditional safeguards at revocation hearings would be more per-
suasive when focused upon this stage of the proposed hearing.
release situation, but was a case of a prisoner released by reason of statutory allowance
for good conduct. In this latter situation, said the court, a different rule applies with
respect to revocation hearings held, as was the hearing in this case, after the date at
which the original sentence was to expire. Id. at 973. The court thus passed an oppor-
tunity to distinguish the Board's functions and rested the holding instead on a more
technical and less potentially important distinction.
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